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Lessons from the Sub-Prime Crisis 
 
MELVYN TEO1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We show that there is significant variation in performance across hedge funds during the 
subprime crisis. Hedge funds that (i) invested in Asia, (ii) had equity exposure, (iii) adopted 
directional strategies, or (iv) allowed for frequent redemptions, underperformed other funds. 
Moreover, leveraged funds did not fare significantly worse than their non-leveraged 
counterparts. Our results suggest that credit market illiquidity was not directly responsible for the 
bloodshed amongst hedge funds. Rather, funds were hurt by an increase in global risk aversion 
and by fire sales conducted in anticipation of redemptions.   
 
 
 
 August 2007 was a tumultuous month for the hedge fund industry. Reports are rife in the 
media about hedge fund who were caught on the wrong side of the subprime mortgage trade. 
Several seemingly good quantitative hedge funds (e.g., Renaissance Technologies, AQR, and 
Goldman Sachs Asset Management) posted extremely dismal returns. Many funds were reported 
to have cut risk exposure in order to cater to the expected deluge of redemptions that typically 
follow poor performance. Industry watchers argue that credit market illiquidity, fire sales in 
anticipation of redemptions, and an increase in global risk aversion conspired to hurt hedge funds 
in August.  
 
 In this issue of the statistical digest, we perform a post-mortem on the subprime induced 
crisis. We characterize the distribution of fund performance in August 2007, examine which 
hedge funds where most affected by or insulated from the crisis, and discriminate between the 
various likely explanations for the negative spike in fund performance. Our analysis is based on a 
large sample of funds culled from four global hedge fund databases: TASS, MSCI, Eurekahedge, 
and Asiahedge. The following Venn diagram breaks down the funds by database. The presence 
of many funds unique to a specific database underscores the importance of collecting fund data 
from several sources so as to better proxy the entire fund population. 
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Figure 1: Breakdown of fund sample by database 
 
 
 
 To measure the impact of the crisis on fund performance, we compare the distribution of 
fund returns for July 2007 and August 2007. Figure 2 plots the kernel density functions for the 
fund distributions for July and August.  In addition to a 2.23 percent reduction in fund average 
return in August relative to July, we find that the distribution of fund returns skews to the left as 
a result of the crisis. This suggests that most of the funds had poor returns during August. 
Specifically, in July, most of the funds had returns greater than that of the modal fund, i.e., 17 
basis points. In contrast, in August, most of the funds had returns worse than that of the modal 
fund, i.e., -71 basis points. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of hedge fund performance in July and August 2007 
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 The 2.23 percent reduction in average fund monthly return seems small. However, as 
shown below in Figure 3, there is substantial variation in performance across investment styles. 
Hedge funds engaged in directional strategies like bottom-up, CTA, macro, and equity long/short 
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were most affected by the events in August while funds engaged in non-directional strategies like 
arbitrage and relative value emerged relatively unscathed. It is interesting to note that strategies 
with high equity exposure (bottom-up and long/short equity) suffered more than strategies with 
high credit market exposure (distressed debt and fixed income).  
 
Figure 3: Variation in performance across investment styles in July and August 2007 
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 To gain further insight into the cross-sectional variation in fund returns in August, we 
compare the performance of funds investing in Asia, U.S., and Europe. The variation in fund 
returns across investment regions shown in Figure 4 is broadly consistent with the flight to 
quality or global increase in risk aversion story. We find that even though the crisis originated 
from problems in the U.S. mortgage markets, funds investing in Asia suffered the most 
significant losses, while funds investing in the U.S. suffered the smallest losses. The average 
fund return was -2.58 percent for Asia focused funds, -1.84 percent for Europe focused funds, 
and -1.26 percent for U.S. focused funds.  
 
Figure 4: Distribution of hedge fund returns in August 2007, stratified by investment region 
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 Figure 5 further breaks down fund performance by investment region and investment 
style. We observe that the underperformance of Asia focused funds is not uniform across 
investment styles. It tends to be concentrated in bottom-up, long/short equity, fixed income, and 
relative value funds. Long/short equity and bottom-up funds dominate the Asia-focused sample, 
hence underperformance in these styles will naturally show up in the fund distribution of Figure 
4.  
Figure 5: Variation in performance across investment styles and regions in August 2007  
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 To further discriminate between the likely causes of hedge fund underperformance in 
August 2007, we estimate cross-sectional regressions on August 2007 fund returns. We seek to 
explain the variation in performance with various fund characteristics including fees, assets 
under management, minimum investments, age, leverage, redemption period, and the presence of 
a local headquarters. If funds that use leverage and who had longer redemption periods posted 
lower returns, then one may conclude that a liquidity crunch was responsible for much of the 
bloodshed in the industry. Conversely, if leveraged funds did not fare any worse than non-
leveraged funds, and funds holding illiquid securities (as proxied by funds with a longer 
redemption period) outperformed other more liquid funds, then it is unlikely that the root cause 
of the underperformance is illiquidity.   
 
 Table 1 reports the coefficient estimates from the aforementioned cross-sectional 
regression. We find evidence inconsistent with the illiquidity hypothesis. Leveraged funds do not 
perform significantly worse than funds who eschew leverage. Indeed, the coefficient estimates 
on the redemption period variable suggests that funds holding illiquid securities outperform other 
funds. The overperformance appears economically relevant. Funds with semi-annual 
redemptions outperform funds with monthly redemptions by about 50 basis points in August. 
One view is that the higher redemption periods of these funds allow them to avoid the 
redemption-induced fire sales that hurt other funds. A related view is that funds investing in 
illiquid securities would have lower mark to market losses as liquid securities are the ones that 
are liquidated and therefore funds holding these securities end up reporting losses not the funds 
with illiquid securities. It is noteworthy that in line with previous studies on local information 
advantage and hedge funds (see, for example, Teo (2007)), funds with a local presence 
outperform funds without a local presence by 0.76 percent in August.  
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Table 1 
univariate multivariate univariate multivariate
Management fee (%) -0.216 -0.210 -0.413 -0.22
(-2.10) (-2.07) (-3.01) (-2.13)
Performance fee (%) 0.014 0.018 -0.005 0.006
(0.72) (0.92) (-0.19) (0.22)
Redemption period (business days) 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.005
(3.69) (3.04) (4.06) (3.05)
Minimum investment (US$m) 0.010 -0.008 -0.001 -0.028
(0.22) (-0.17) (-0.02) (-0.43)
Assets under management (US$m) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.34) (0.64) (0.45) (0.47)
Age (years) 0.016 0.001 0.117 0.094
(1.12) (0.07) (6.80) (5.48)
Local headquarters 0.762 0.720 1.379 1.298
(5.35) (5.02) (7.44) (6.98)
Leverage -0.145 -0.062 0.155 0.266
(-1.03) (-0.44) (0.82) (1.44)
All funds Long/Short Equity funds
Cross-sectional regressions on hedge fund returns in August 2007. The independent variables are hedge fund
characteristics including management fee in percentage, performance fee in percentage, redemption period in business
days, minimum investment in US$m, assets under management in US$m, age in years, an indicator variable that equals one
if a fund has a local headquarters, and an indicator variable that equals one if a fund uses leverage. The regressions for the
"all funds" sample include investment style dummies. The t-statistics from heteroscedasticity consistent White (1980)
standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 1% level are in bold. The
regression sample includes 4102 hedge funds with sufficient return and characteristics information, of which 1957 are
long/short equity funds. 
Cross-sectional regression on hedge fund returns in August 2007
 
 To summarize, the analysis thus far has shown that credit market illiquidity by itself is 
unlikely to explain the dismal performance of the hedge fund industry in August. On average, 
funds that were exposed to the credit markets performed better than funds that were exposed to 
the equity markets. Funds that had exposure to illiquid securities outperformed funds that had 
exposure to more liquid securities. Rather, it was a capital flight to quality, i.e., away from more 
risky Asian stocks and towards developed country stocks, that created problems for funds. These 
problems were aggravated when funds with short redemption periods had to conduct fire sales in 
anticipation of month-end redemptions. In a sense, our broad conclusion dovetails with that of 
Amenc (2007) who argues that hedge funds are the victims and not the source of the sub-prime 
crisis. 
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